David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press (2005)
Using the language of common-sense psychology, we explain human behavior by citing its reason or purpose, and this is central to our understanding of human beings as agents. On the other hand, since human beings are physical objects, human behavior should also be explicable in the language of physical science, in which causal accounts cast human beings as collections of physical particles. CSP talk of mind and agency, however, does not seem to mesh well with the language of physical science.In Teleological Realism, Scott Sehon argues that CSP explanations are not causal but teleological -- that they cite the purpose or goal of the behavior in question rather than an antecedent state that caused the behavior. CSP explanations of behavior, Sehon claims, are answering a question different from that answered by physical science explanations, and, accordingly, CSP explanations and physical science explanations are independent of one another. Common-sense facts about mind and agency can thus be independent of the physical facts about human beings, and, contrary to the views of most philosophers of mind in recent decades, common-sense psychology will not be subsumed by physical science.Sehon defends his non-reductionist account of mind and agency in clear and nontechnical language. He carefully distinguishes his view from forms of "strong naturalism" that would seem to preclude it. And he evaluates key objections to teleological realism, including those posed by Donald Davidson's influential article "Actions, Reasons and Causes" and some put forth by more recent proponents of causal theories of action. CSP, Sehon argues, has a different realm than does physical science; the normative notions that are central to CSP are not reducible to physical facts and laws
|Keywords||Agency Metaphysics Realism Supervenience Teleology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$3.85 used (90% off) $7.96 new (78% off) $36.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Daniel D. Hutto (2008). The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Clarifications and Implications. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):175 – 192.
Scott Sehon & Donald Stanley (2010). Evidence and Simplicity: Why We Should Reject Homeopathy. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):276-281.
Michael Smith (2012). Four Objections to the Standard Story of Action (and Four Replies). Philosophical Issues 22 (1):387-401.
Daniel D. Hutto (2008). Limited Engagements and Narrative Extensions. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):419 – 444.
Similar books and articles
Jorn Sonderholm (2008). Why Supervenience is a Problem for Brink's Version of Moral Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:203-213.
Scott R. Sehon (1997). Deviant Causal Chains and the Irreducibility of Teleological Explanation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2):195–213.
Simon W. Blackburn (1984). Supervenience Revisited. In Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge University Press 59--74.
Sara Worley (2006). Review of Scott Sehon, Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (2).
Ausonio Marras (2001). On Putnam's Critique of Metaphysical Realism: Mind-Body Identity and Supervenience. Synthese 126 (3):407-426.
James C. Klagge (1988). Supervenience: Ontological and Ascriptive. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (December):461-70.
Mark Bauer (2009). Normativity Without Artifice. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):239-259.
Tobin Nellhaus (2004). From Embodiment to Agency: Cognitive Science, Critical Realism and Communication Frameworks. Journal of Critical Realism 3 (1):103-132.
Carolyn Price (2007). Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation – Scott R. Sehon. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):501–503.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads5 ( #529,475 of 1,934,854 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #196,395 of 1,934,854 )
How can I increase my downloads?