David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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This paper examines deﬁnitions of independence for events and variables in the context of full conditional measures; that is, when conditional probability is a primitive notion and conditioning is allowed on null events. Several independence concepts are evaluated with respect to graphoid properties; we show that properties of weak union, contraction and intersection may fail when null events are present. We propose a concept of “full” independence, characterize the form of a full conditional measure under full independence, and suggest how to build a theory of Bayesian networks that accommodates null events.
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