Trivial, Platitudinous, Boring? Searle on Conceptual Relativism

In Dirk Franken, Attila Karakus & Jan Michel (eds.), John R. Searle. Thinking About the Real World. Ontos (2010)
In this paper we explore Searle’s defense of conceptual relativism. It emerges that Searle formulates the thesis in many different ways and that contrary to his contention not all are trivial and platitudinous. Specifically he does not distinguish clearly between an ontological and a linguistic version of conceptual relativism as well as between weak difference and stronger incommensurability of conceptual schemes. This has consequences for Searle’s defense of external realism.
Keywords conceptual relativism  John Searle  incommensurability
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