Some Metacomplete Relevant Modal Logics

Studia Logica 101 (5):1115-1141 (2013)
A logic is called metacomplete if formulas that are true in a certain preferred interpretation of that logic are theorems in its metalogic. In the area of relevant logics, metacompleteness is used to prove primeness, consistency, the admissibility of γ and so on. This paper discusses metacompleteness and its applications to a wider class of modal logics based on contractionless relevant logics and their neighbours using Slaney’s metavaluational technique
Keywords Relevant modal logic  Metacompleteness  Primeness  Consistency  Admissibility of γ
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DOI 10.1007/s11225-012-9433-8
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References found in this work BETA
Robert K. Meyer (1976). Metacompleteness. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 17 (4):501-516.

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