Collins's incorrect depiction of Dreyfus's critique of artificial intelligence

Harry Collins interprets Hubert Dreyfus’s philosophy of embodiment as a criticism of all possible forms of artificial intelligence. I argue that this characterization is inaccurate and predicated upon a misunderstanding of the relevance of phenomenology for empirical scientific research
Keywords artificial intelligence  Hubert Dreyfus  Harry Collins  embodiment  phenomenology
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-006-9039-6
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Evan Selinger, Hubert Dreyfus & Harry Collins (2007). Interactional Expertise and Embodiment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (4):722-740.
Selinger, Evan, Dreyfus, Hubert & Harry Collins (2007). Interactional Expertise and Embodiment. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 38 (4):722-740.

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