Induction as vindication
Philosophy of Science 31 (3):197-231 (1964)
| Abstract | 1. I shall attempt in this paper to give a rounded, if schematic, account of the concept of probability. My central concern will be to clarify the sense in which law-like statements (including 'statistical' law-like statements) are made probable by observational data which, in a sense equally demanding analysis, 'accord' with them | |||||||||
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