Philosophy and the scientific image of man

In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview 35-78 (1963)
The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term. Under 'things in the broadest possible sense' I include such radically different items as not only 'cabbages and kings', but numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience and death. To achieve success in philosophy would be, to use a contemporary turn of phrase, to 'know one's way around' with respect to all these things, not in that unreflective way in which the centipede of the story knew its way around before it faced the question, 'how do I walk?', but in that reflective way which means that no intellectual holds are barred
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Chris Daly & David Liggins (2011). Deferentialism. Philosophical Studies 156 (3):321-337.

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