God and possible worlds: On what there must be

Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):285-297 (1989)
Charles sayward has taken alvin plantinga to task for what he sees to be an invalid modal ontological argument in chapter 10 of "the nature of necessity". I begin by examining sayward's complaint and demonstrating that plantinga has anticipated and blocked it in his argument for what he later calls "serious actualism"--The thesis that no objects bear properties in worlds in which they do not exist. I then show how plantinga could block sayward even without this thesis. Finally, I examine plantinga's argument anew and find it either equivocal or reliant on a dubious premise
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1989.tb00490.x
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