Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief

Synthese 94 (3):453 - 476 (1993)
In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epistemic status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01064489
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PhilPapers Archive Thomas D. Senor, Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief
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Jennifer Lackey (2005). Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):636–658.

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