David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 94 (3):453 - 476 (1993)
In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epistemic status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
Matthew McGrath (2007). Memory and Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 157 (1):1 - 24.
Sven Bernecker (2007). Remembering Without Knowing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):137 – 156.
Jennifer Lackey (2005). Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):636–658.
Shin Sakuragi (2010). On Memory Knowledge. Kagaku Tetsugaku 43 (1):61-77.
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