Perception, Evidence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement

In this paper I argue for a version of the Total Evidence view according to which the rational response to disagreement depends upon one's total evidence. I argue that perceptual evidence of a certain kind is significantly weightier than many other types of evidence, including testimonial. Furthermore, what is generally called "The Uniqueness Thesis" is actually a conflation of two distinct principles that I dub "Evidential Uniqueness" and "Rationality Uniqueness." The former principle is likely true but the latter almost certainly false. Seeing why the Rationality Uniqueness fails opens the door to seeing how mutual reasonable disagreement is possible even among those who share the same evidence.
Keywords Disagreement  Uniqueness Thesis  Perceptual Evidence
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PhilPapers Archive Thomas D. Senor, Perception, Evidence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement
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