David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):133-151 (1992)
In the third chapter of his book Psychosemantics , Jerry A. Fodor argues that the truth of meaning holism (the thesis that the content of a psychological state is determined by the totality of that state's epistemic liaisons) would be fatal for intentionalistic psychology. This is because holism suggests that no two people are ever in the same intentional state, and so a psychological theory that generalizes over such states will be composed of generalizations which fail to generalize. Fodor then sets out to show that there is no reason to believe in holism by arguing that its primary foundation (i.e. functional-role semantics), when properly understood (i.e. when construed as a two-factor theory of content), is demonstrably false. In this paper, I argue two claims. First, I try to show that Fodor has seriously misrepresented two-factor theories and that his arguments against his strawman do nothing to indicate the falsity of the genuine article. Second, I argue that if one accepts meaning holism in the form of a two-factor theory, there is no particular reason to think that one is hereby committed to the futility of intentionalistic psychology. In making this point, I make a brief excursion into the psychological literature during which I discuss the belief perseverance phenomenon, the encoding specificity hypothesis, and a problem in human deductive reasoning. My second argument leads to a discussion of how such a psychology could be developed even if no two people are ever in the same intentional state
|Keywords||Mind Psychology Science Semantics Wholism Fodor, J|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross (1980). Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Prentice-Hall.
Stephen P. Stich (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.
Mark Greenberg & Gilbert Harman (2007). Conceptual Role Semantics. In Ernest LePore & Barry Smith (eds.), Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. Oxford University Press 242-256.
P. C. Wason & P. N. Johnson (1974). Psychology of Reasoning: Structure and Content. Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (3):193-197.
Citations of this work BETA
Charles Nussbaum (2001). Troubles with the Causal Homeostasis Theory of Reference. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):155 – 178.
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