Color subjectivism is not supported by color reductionism

Philosophica (Belgium) 68 (2):61-87 (2001)
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Abstract

If all the participants in the color ontology debate are naturalists with good sciences on their side, how could color subjectivism win? The apparent reason is that subjectivism is supported by the opponent process theory that is a successful neurophysiological reduction of colors. We will argue that the real reason is the unique reductive methodology of the opponent paradigm. We will undermine subjectivism by arguing against the methodology

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Tom Seppalainen
Portland State University

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The Structure of Science.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):275-275.
The triple helix: gene, organism, and environment.Richard C. Lewontin - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Edited by Richard C. Lewontin.

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