Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||This paper is about the question of what to do under fundamental normative uncertainty. More specifically, it is about a problem that seems to confront all of the plausible answers to that question -- that it is impossible to compare the values of actions across different normative views or theories. I present a solution to that problem.|
|Keywords||intertheoretic comparisons moral uncertainty Motivation Independence Rule Blame Independence Rule|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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