Normative uncertainty for non-cognitivists

Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207 (2012)
Abstract
Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) any brand of non-cognitivism that has even a chance of solving the Frege–Geach Problem and some related problems involving probabilistic consistency can also thereby solve Smith’s problem. Because only versions of non-cognitivism that can solve the Frege–Geach Problem are otherwise plausible, all otherwise plausible versions of noncognitivism can meet Smith’s challenge
Keywords Non-cognitivism  Normative uncertainty  Frege–Geach Problem  Michael Smith  Expressivism
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Jamie Dreier (2006). Negation for Expressivists. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1.

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