David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207 (2012)
Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) any brand of non-cognitivism that has even a chance of solving the Frege–Geach Problem and some related problems involving probabilistic consistency can also thereby solve Smith’s problem. Because only versions of non-cognitivism that can solve the Frege–Geach Problem are otherwise plausible, all otherwise plausible versions of noncognitivism can meet Smith’s challenge.
|Keywords||Non-cognitivism Normative uncertainty Frege–Geach Problem Michael Smith Expressivism|
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References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
Mark Andrew Schroeder (2008/2010). Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford University Press.
Seth Yalcin (2011). Nonfactualism About Epistemic Modality. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
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Citations of this work BETA
Nicholas Baima (2014). The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):593-605.
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