Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||philosophers of science have in succession defended and, indeed, taken seriously the following claims on the issue: (a) that reductionism is a pri- ori true, (b) that it is contingently true, (c) that it is contingently false, and (d) that it is a priori false. Of these, (a) is now completely abandoned, (b) is moribund, (c) is presently a dominant view, and (d) is an influential and controversial position (see D. Davidson, 1970), but largely restricted..|
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