Against internalism

Noûs 38 (2):266–298 (2004)
Abstract
Argues that practical irrationality is akin to moral culpability: it is defective practical thought which one could legitimately have been expected to avoid. It is thus a mistake to draw too tight a connection between failure to be moved by reasons and practical irrationality (as in a certain kind of "internalism"): one's failure may be genuine, but not culpable, and therefore not irrational.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00470.x
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kieran Setiya (2014). What is a Reason to Act? Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.
Alex Worsnip (2015). The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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