David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 38 (2):266–298 (2004)
Argues that practical irrationality is akin to moral culpability: it is defective practical thought which one could legitimately have been expected to avoid. It is thus a mistake to draw too tight a connection between failure to be moved by reasons and practical irrationality (as in a certain kind of "internalism"): one's failure may be genuine, but not culpable, and therefore not irrational.
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References found in this work BETA
E. J. Bond (1983). Reason and Value. Cambridge University Press.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
C. D. Broad (1985). Ethics. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
John Broome (1997). Reasons and Motivation: John Broome. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.
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Citations of this work BETA
Kieran Setiya (2014). What is a Reason to Act? Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.
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