Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason

Ethics 117 (4):649-673 (2007)
Argues for a "cognitivist" account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
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DOI 10.1086/518954
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Stephen Finlay (2009). Oughts and Ends. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):315 - 340.
Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.

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