Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason

Ethics 117 (4):649-673 (2007)
Abstract
Argues for a "cognitivist" account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
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    Michael E. Bratman (2011). Intention Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.
    Stephen Finlay (2009). Oughts and Ends. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):315 - 340.

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