Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason

Ethics 117 (4):649-673 (2007)
Abstract
Argues for a "cognitivist" account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,269
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Michael E. Bratman (2011). Intention Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.
Stephen Finlay (2009). Oughts and Ends. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):315 - 340.

View all 17 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

136 ( #5,656 of 1,096,231 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #15,356 of 1,096,231 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.