Explaining action

Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393 (2003)
Argues that, in acting for a reason, one takes that reason to explain one's action, not to justify it: reasons for acting need not be seen "under the guise of the good". The argument turns on the need to explain the place of "practical knowledge" - knowing what one is doing - in intentional action. A revised and expanded version of this material appears in Part One of "Reasons without Rationalism" (Princeton, 2007).
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-112-3-339
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Yair Levy (2015). Normativity and Self-Relations. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):359-374.

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