Knowing How

Abstract
Argues from the possibility of basic intentional action to a non-propositional theory of knowing how. The argument supports a broadly Anscombean conception of the will as a capacity for practical knowledge
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Refeng Tang (2011). Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
Yuri Cath (2011). Knowing How Without Knowing That. In John Bengson & Mark Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. 113.
Tobias Rosefeldt (2004). Is Knowing-How Simply a Case of Knowing-That? Philosophical Investigations 27 (4):370–379.
Jeremy Fantl (2008). Knowing-How and Knowing-That. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
Kieran Setiya (2003). Explaining Action. Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.
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