Knowledge of intention
In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press (2011)
| Abstract | Argues that it is not by inference from intention that I know what I am doing intentionally. Instead, the reverse is true: groundless knowledge of intention rests on the will as a capacity for non-perceptual, non-inferential knowledge of action. The argument adapts and clarifies considerations of "transparency" more familiar in connection with belief. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesSarah K. Paul (2009). Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking: Setiya on “Practical Knowledge”. Ethics 119 (3):546-557.
Alex Byrne (2011). Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
Andy Hamilton (2008). Intention and the Authority of Avowals. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):23 – 37.
Kieran Setiya (2009). Practical Knowledge Revisited. Ethics 120 (1):128-137.
Richard Holton (2008). Partial Belief, Partial Intention. Mind 117 (465):27-58.
Elazar Weinryb (1974). Von Wright on Historical Causation1. Inquiry 17 (1-4):327-338.
Kieran Setiya (2008). Practical Knowledge. Ethics 118 (3):388-409.
Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst (2008). Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action. Mind 117 (467):549-573.
Kieran Setiya (2009). Intention. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Roger Scruton (1977). Self-Knowledge and Intention. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77:87-106.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-04-08Total downloads216 ( #1,071 of 549,500 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,790 of 549,500 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
