Knowledge of intention

In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press 170--197 (2011)
Argues that it is not by inference from intention that I know what I am doing intentionally. Instead, the reverse is true: groundless knowledge of intention rests on the will as a capacity for non-perceptual, non-inferential knowledge of action. The argument adapts and clarifies considerations of "transparency" more familiar in connection with belief.
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Alex Byrne (2011). Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
Kieran Setiya (2013). Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):179-198.
Sarah K. Paul (2014). The Transparency of Mind. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):295-303.
Nicholas Silins (2013). Introspection and Inference. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.

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