Neural darwinism and consciousness

Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):140-168 (2005)
Neural Darwinism (ND) is a large scale selectionist theory of brain development and function that has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness. According to ND, consciousness is entailed by reentrant interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system (the ‘dynamic core’). These interactions, which permit high-order discriminations among possible core states, confer selective advantages on organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual events to a past history of value-dependent learning. Here, we assess the consistency of ND with 16 widely recognized properties of consciousness, both physiological (for example, consciousness is associated with widespread, relatively fast, low amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical system), and phenomenal (for example, consciousness involves the existence of a private flow of events available only to the experiencing subject). While no theory accounts fully for all of these properties at present, we find that ND and its recent extensions fare well.
Keywords *Consciousness States  *Darwinism  *Neural Development  *Neurobiology  Brain  Cerebral Cortex  Neuroanatomy  Neurophysiology  Thalamus
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2004.08.008
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Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.

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