Practical knowledge

Ethics 118 (3):388-409 (2008)
Abstract
Argues that we know without observation or inference at least some of what we are doing intentionally and that this possibility must be explained in terms of knowledge-how. It is a consequence of the argument that knowing how to do something cannot be identified with knowledge of a proposition.
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John Schwenkler (2011). Perception and Practical Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152.
Sarah K. Paul (2012). How We Know What We Intend. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.

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