Practical Knowledge Revisited

Ethics 120 (1):128-137 (2009)
Argues that the view propounded in "Practical Knowledge" (Ethics 118: 388-409) survives objections made by Sarah Paul ("Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking," Ethics 119: 546-557). The response gives more explicit treatment to the nature and epistemology of knowing how.
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DOI 10.1086/606000
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Sarah K. Paul (2012). How We Know What We Intend. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.

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