Reasons and Causes

European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):129-157 (2011)
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Abstract

Argues for a causal-psychological account of acting for reasons. This view is distinguished from a more ambitious causal theory of action, clarified as far as possible, and motivated—against non-reductive, teleological, and behaviourist alternatives—on broadly metaphysical grounds

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Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Group Action Without Group Minds.Kenneth Silver - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):321-342.
Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.
Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Instrumental Structure of Actions.Markos Valaris - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):64-83.
The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons.Fabian Dorsch - 2018 - In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.

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