Reasons and Causes

European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):129-157 (2011)
Abstract
Argues for a causal-psychological account of acting for reasons. This view is distinguished from a more ambitious causal theory of action, clarified as far as possible, and motivated—against non-reductive, teleological, and behaviourist alternatives—on broadly metaphysical grounds
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References found in this work BETA
Michael E. Bratman (2001). Two Problems About Human Agency. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326.
Ursula Coope (2007). Aristotle on Action. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):109–138.
Jonathan Dancy (2008). On How to Act : Disjunctively. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 262--282.

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