Are connectionist models cognitive?

Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):235-255 (1992)
In their critique of connectionist models Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) dismiss such models as not being cognitive or psychological. Evaluating Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique requires examining what is required in characterizating models as 'cognitive'. The present discussion examines the various senses of this term. It argues the answer to the title question seems to vary with these different senses. Indeed, by one sense of the term, neither representa-tionalism nor connectionism is cognitive. General ramifications of such an appraisal are discussed and alternative avenues for cognitive research are suggested
Keywords Cognitivism  Psychology  Representationalism  Science
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DOI 10.1080/09515089208573059
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