A defence of categorical reasons

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):189-206 (2009)
Abstract
In this paper I offer two arguments designed to defend the existence of categorical reasons, which I define as those justifying considerations that obtain independently of their relation to an agent's commitments. The first argument is based on certain paradigm cases meant to reveal difficulties for practical instrumentalism—the view, as I define it here, that categorical reasons do not exist, because all reasons must serve the commitments of the agents to whom they apply. The second argument relies on considerations of responsibility and blame to establish the existence of categorical reasons.
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References found in this work BETA
Gilbert Harman (1975). Moral Relativism Defended. Philosophical Review 84 (1):3-22.
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