A new argument for evidentialism

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498 (2006)
When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct if and only if p. This normative truth entails that only evidence can be a reason for belief. Although evidentialism does not follow directly from the mere psychological truth that we cannot believe for non-evidential reasons, it does follow directly from the normative conceptual truth about belief which explains why we cannot do so
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.454.x
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References found in this work BETA
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Peter Railton (1986). Moral Realism. Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.

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Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Rinard (2015). No Exception for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
Niko Kolodny (2007). How Does Coherence Matter? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.

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