David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Episteme 5 (2):pp. 203-219 (2008)
Following the standard practice in sociology, cultural anthropology and history, sociologists, historians of science and some philosophers of science define scientific communities as groups with shared beliefs, values and practices. In this paper it is argued that in real cases the beliefs of the members of such communities often vary significantly in important ways. This has rather dire implications for the convergence defense against the charge of the excessive subjectivity of subjective Bayesianism because that defense requires that communities of Bayesian inquirers share a significant set of modal beliefs. The important implication is then that given the actual variation in modal beliefs across individuals, either Bayesians cannot claim that actual theories have been objectively confirmed or they must accept that such theories have been confirmed relative only to epistemically insignificant communities
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Haim Gaifman & Marc Snir (1982). Probabilities Over Rich Languages, Testing and Randomness. Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (3):495-548.
Citations of this work BETA
Helen de Cruz & Johan de Smedt (2012). Evolved Cognitive Biases and the Epistemic Status of Scientific Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):411-429.
Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt (2012). Evolved Cognitive Biases and the Epistemic Status of Scientific Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):411 - 429.
Similar books and articles
Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew (2010). An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.
Richard Bradley (2001). Ramsey and the Measurement of Belief. In David Corfield & Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism.
Michael Kruse (1999). Beyond Bayesianism: Comments on Hellman's "Bayes and Beyond". Philosophy of Science 66 (1):165-174.
Christopher J. G. Meacham (2010). Unravelling the Tangled Web: Continuity, Internalism, Non-Uniqueness and Self-Locating Beliefs. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 3. Oxford University Press 86.
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon Brittan (2010). Two Dogmas of Strong Objective Bayesianism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):45 – 65.
Samir Okasha (2005). Bayesianism and the Traditional Problem of Induction. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):181-194.
Michael J. Shaffer (2001). Bayesian Confirmation of Theories That Incorporate Idealizations. Philosophy of Science 68 (1):36-52.
Kenny Easwaran (2011). Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):312-320.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #132,759 of 1,907,681 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #158,844 of 1,907,681 )
How can I increase my downloads?