David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 5 (4):467-87 (1995)
Computationalism, the notion that cognition is computation, is a working hypothesis of many AI researchers and Cognitive Scientists. Although it has not been proved, neither has it been disproved. In this paper, I give some refutations to some well-known alleged refutations of computationalism. My arguments have two themes: people are more limited than is often recognized in these debates; computer systems are more complicated than is often recognized in these debates. To underline the latter point, I sketch the design and abilities of a possible embodied computer system
|Keywords||Artificial Intelligence Computation Logic Science|
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Gualtiero Piccinini & Sonya Bahar (2013). Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition. Cognitive Science 37 (3):453-488.
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