Minds and Machines 5 (4):467-87 (1995)
  Computationalism, the notion that cognition is computation, is a working hypothesis of many AI researchers and Cognitive Scientists. Although it has not been proved, neither has it been disproved. In this paper, I give some refutations to some well-known alleged refutations of computationalism. My arguments have two themes: people are more limited than is often recognized in these debates; computer systems are more complicated than is often recognized in these debates. To underline the latter point, I sketch the design and abilities of a possible embodied computer system
Keywords Artificial Intelligence  Computation  Logic  Science
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DOI 10.1007/BF00974982
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References found in this work BETA
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Frederic B. Fitch (1952). Symbolic Logic. New York, Ronald Press Co..

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