Contractualism and restrictions

Philosophical Studies 132 (2):293 - 299 (2007)
T.M. Scanlon writes that deontological constraints on taking lives are to be defended “by considering what principles licensing others to take our lives could be reasonably rejected.” I argue that Scanlon can offer no such defence of deontological constraints.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.2307/25471858
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
T. M. Scanlon (2000). Intention and Permissibility, I. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):301–317.
T. M. Scanlon (2003). Replies. Ratio 16 (4):424–439.

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