Consciousness and the computer: A reply to Henley

Journal of Mind and Behavior 12 (3):371-375 (1991)
Abstract
This paper is a response to Henley who criticizes a previous paper of mine arguing against my claim that computers are devoid of consciousness. While the claim regarding computers and consciousness was not the main theme of my original paper, I do, indeed, subscribe to it. Here, I review the main characteristics of human consciousness presented in the earlier paper and argue that computers cannot exhibit them. Any ascription of these characteristics to computers is superficial and misleading in that it fails to capture essential, intrinsic features of human cognition. More generally, psychological theory couched in terms of semantic representations and the computational operations associated with them is bound to be inadequate. The phenomenology of consciousness is a specific case marking this inadequacy
Keywords Computer  Consciousness  Metaphysics  Henley, T
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