Coherence, Justification, and the AGM Theory of Belief Revision
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Yves Bouchard (ed.), Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe. 139--160 (2002)
In a recent article, Peter Gärdenfors (1992) has suggested that the AGM (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson) theory of belief revision can be given an epistemic basis by interpreting the revision postulates of that theory in terms of a version of the coherence theory of justification. To accomplish this goal Gärdenfors suggests that the AGM revision postulates concerning the conservative nature of belief revision can be interpreted in terms of a concept of epistemic entrenchment and that there are good empirical reasons to adopt this view as opposed to some form of foundationalist account of the justification of our beliefs. In this paper I argue that Gärdenfors’ attempt to underwrite the AGM theory of belief revision by appealing to a form of coherentism is seriously inadequate for several reasons.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael J. Shaffer (2009). Decision Theory, Intelligent Planning and Counterfactuals. Minds and Machines 19 (1):61-92.
Similar books and articles
Giacomo Bonanno (2008). Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework. In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
Giacomo Bonanno (2012). Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-Consistency and Iterated Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):201-236.
Sven Ove Hansson & Erik J. Olsson (1999). Providing Foundations for Coherentism. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):243-265.
Neil Tennant (2006). On the Degeneracy of the Full AGM-Theory of Theory-Revision. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):661 - 676.
Mark Jago (2006). Resource-Bounded Belief Revision and Contraction. In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer. 141--154.
Giacomo Bonanno (2007). Axiomatic Characterization of the AGM Theory of Belief Revision in a Temporal Logic. Artificial Intelligence 171 (2-3):144-160.
Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo (2001). Infinitary Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl (1997). On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision. Artificial Intelligence 89:1-29.
Edwin D. Mares (2002). A Paraconsistent Theory of Belief Revision. Erkenntnis 56 (2):229 - 246.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-08-05
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?