|Abstract||One of the most important ongoing debates in the philosophy of mind is the debate over the reality of the first-person character of consciousness. Philosophers on one side of this debate hold that some features of experience are accessible only from a first-person standpoint. Some members of this camp, notably Frank Jackson, have maintained that epiphenomenal properties play roles in consciousness ; others, notably John R. Searle, have rejected dualism and regarded mental phenomena as entirely biological. In the opposite camp are philosophers who hold that all mental capacities are in some sense computational - or, more broadly, explainable in terms of features of information processing systems. Consistent with this explanatory agenda, members of this camp normally deny that any aspect of mind is accessible solely from a first-person standpoint. This denial sometimes goes very far - even as far as Dennett's claim that the phenomenology of conscious experience does not really exist|
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