David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):367-447 (1994)
A number of ways of taxonomizing human learning have been proposed. We examine the evidence for one such proposal, namely, that there exist independent explicit and implicit learning systems. This combines two further distinctions, (1) between learning that takes place with versus without concurrent awareness, and (2) between learning that involves the encoding of instances (or fragments) versus the induction of abstract rules or hypotheses. Implicit learning is assumed to involve unconscious rule learning. We examine the evidence for implicit learning derived from subliminal learning, conditioning, artificial grammar learning, instrumental learning, and reaction times in sequence learning. We conclude that unconscious learning has not been satisfactorily established in any of these areas. The assumption that learning in some of these tasks (e.g., artificial grammar learning) is predominantly based on rule abstraction is questionable. When subjects cannot report the rules that govern stimulus selection, this is often because their knowledge consists of instances or fragments of the training stimuli rather than rules. In contrast to the distinction between conscious and unconscious learning, the distinction between instance and rule learning is a sound and meaningful way of taxonomizing human learning. We discuss various computational models of these two forms of learning
|Keywords||artificial grammar categorization connectionism consciousness explicit/implicit processes instances learning memory rules|
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References found in this work BETA
Gilbert Ryle (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Citations of this work BETA
Kristian Sandberg, Bert Timmermans, Morten Overgaard & Axel Cleeremans (2010). Measuring Consciousness: Is One Measure Better Than the Other? Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1069-1078.
Ben R. Newell & David R. Shanks (2014). Unconscious Influences on Decision Making: A Critical Review. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38 (1):1-19.
Michał Wierzchoń, Dariusz Asanowicz, Borysław Paulewicz & Axel Cleeremans (2012). Subjective Measures of Consciousness in Artificial Grammar Learning Task. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1141-1153.
Nick Reed, Peter McLeod & Zoltan Dienes (2010). Implicit Knowledge and Motor Skill: What People Who Know How to Catch Don't Know. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):63-76.
Sascha Topolinski & Fritz Strack (2009). Scanning the “Fringe” of Consciousness: What is Felt and What is Not Felt in Intuitions About Semantic Coherence. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):608-618.
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