Can psychology be a unified science?
Philosophy of Science 72 (5):953-963 (2005)
| Abstract | Jaegwon Kim has argued that if psychological kinds are multiply realizable then no single psychological theory can describe regularities ranging over psychological states. Instead, psychology must be fractured, with human psychology covering states realized in the human way, martian psychology covering states realized in the martian way, and so on. I show that even if one accepts the principles that motivate Kim | |||||||||
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Arthur W. Staats (1989). Unificationism: Philosophy for the Modern Disunified Science of Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):143-164.
Ron McClamrock (1993). Emergence Unscathed: Kim on Non-Reducible Types. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3.
Brandon N. Towl (2011). Laws and Constrained Kinds: A Lesson From Motor Neuroscience. Synthese 189 (3):433-450.
G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.
William P. Bechtel & Jennifer Mundale (1999). Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States. Philosophy of Science 66 (2):175-207.
Norman H. Anderson (2008). Unified Social Cognition. Psychology Press.
William E. Seager (1992). Thought and Syntax. Philosophy of Science Association 1992:481-491.
Lawrence Shapiro (2005). Can Psychology Be a Unified Science? Philosophy of Science 72 (5):953-963.
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