David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science Association 1992:469-480 (1992)
Fodor (1990) argues that the theory of evolution by natural selection will not help to save naturalistic accounts of representation from the disjunction problem. This is because, he claims, the context 'was selected for representing things as F' is transparent to the substitution of predicates coextensive with F. But, I respond, from an evolutionary perspective representational contexts cannot be transparent: only under particular descriptions will a representational state appear as a "solution" to a selection "problem" and so be adaptive. Only when we construe representational states as opaque in this manner are the generalizations of branches of evolutionary theory, like foraging theory, possible
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John Barresi & Chris Moore (1996). Intentional Relations and Social Understanding. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107.
R. Goode & P. E. Griffiths (1995). The Misuse of Sober's Selection for/Selection of Distinction. Biology and Philosophy 10 (1):99-108.
Vasudevi Reddy (1996). Omitting the Second Person in Social Understanding. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140.
Marc Artiga (2011). On Several Misuses of Sober's Selection for/Selection of Distinction. Topoi 30 (2):181-193.
Susan Dwyer (1996). Moral Competence is Cognitive but Nonmodular. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):128.
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