Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science Association 1992:469-480 (1992)
|Abstract||Fodor (1990) argues that the theory of evolution by natural selection will not help to save naturalistic accounts of representation from the disjunction problem. This is because, he claims, the context 'was selected for representing things as F' is transparent to the substitution of predicates coextensive with F. But, I respond, from an evolutionary perspective representational contexts cannot be transparent: only under particular descriptions will a representational state appear as a "solution" to a selection "problem" and so be adaptive. Only when we construe representational states as opaque in this manner are the generalizations of branches of evolutionary theory, like foraging theory, possible|
|Keywords||Cognitive Concept Content Science Darwin|
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