Doppelt crossed

Philosophy of Science 55 (1):134-140 (1988)
Abstract
The chief objections raised by Doppelt (this issue, "The Philosophical Requirements for an Adequate Conception of Scientific Rationality") against my views fall into three groups: ones having to do with my concept of "success" (that I have provided no analysis of it, and that therefore my concept of "reason" in science is likewise unexplained; that it requires appeal to some universal criterion); ones having to do with the role of standards or criteria in science (how they are related to substantive beliefs; the possibility of rejecting them); and ones purporting to show that I have not escaped relativism (underdetermination of beliefs; problem of loss in scientific change). I reply to each of these groups of criticisms in turn, concluding with some remarks on the status and validity of the requirements he lays down for any account of scientific rationality
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David Stump (1991). Fallibilism, Naturalism and the Traditional Requirements for Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (3):451-469.
Ruey-lin Chen (2000). Theory Versions Instead of Articulations of a Paradigm. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (3):449-471.
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