Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 190 (3):491-508 (2013)
|Abstract||The Sleeping Beauty puzzle has dramatized the divisive question of how de se beliefs should be integrated into formal theories of rational belief change. In this paper, I look ahead to a related question: how should de se beliefs be integrated into formal theories of rational choice? I argue that standard decision theoretic frameworks fail in special cases of de se uncertainty, like Sleeping Beauty. The nature of the failure reveals that sometimes rational choices are determined independently of one’s credences in the kinds of ‘narrow’ de se propositions that Sleepy Beauty has set in relief. Consequently, in addition to pinpointing a failure of standard decision theoretic frameworks, this result casts doubt on a large class of strategies for determining principles for the rationally updating de se beliefs in cases like Sleeping Beauty, and also calls into question the importance of making such a determination at all.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael G. Titelbaum (2008). The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs. Philosophical Review 117 (4):555-606.
Berry Groisman (2008). The End of Sleeping Beauty's Nightmare. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):409-416.
Brian Weatherson (2011). Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 155 (3):445-456.
Jacob Ross (2010). Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas. Philosophical Review 119 (4):411 - 447.
Ralph Wedgwood (2011). Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
David Phiroze Christensen (2004). Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford University Press.
Darren Bradley (2007). Bayesianism And Self-Locating Beliefs. Dissertation, Stanford University
Sarah Moss (2012). Updating as Communication. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
Christoph Michel & Albert Newen (2010). Self-Deception as Pseudo-Rational Regulation of Belief. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):731-744.
Moritz Schulz (2010). The Dynamics of Indexical Belief. Erkenntnis 72 (3):337 - 351.
Javier Echeverría & José Francisco Álvarez (2008). Bounded Rationality in Social Sciences. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 96 (1):173-189.
Isaac Levi (1997). The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2011-12-15
Total downloads27 ( #51,782 of 740,565 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,957 of 740,565 )
How can I increase my downloads?