Philosophy of Science 56 (3):419-437 (1989)
|Abstract||The alleged problem of "incommensurability" is examined, and attempts to explain scientific change in terms of concepts of meaning and reference are analyzed and rejected. A way of understanding scientific change through a properly developed concept of "reasons" is presented, and the issues of reasons, meaning, and reference are placed in the context of this broader interpretation of scientific change|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Carl R. Kordig (1971). The Comparability of Scientific Theories. Philosophy of Science 38 (4):467-485.
Lena Soler, Howard Sankey & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2008). Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison. Springer.
Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (2000). Continuity Through Revolutions: A Frame-Based Account of Conceptual Change During Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):223.
Gerald Doppelt (1988). The Philosophical Requirements for an Adequate Conception of Scientific Rationality. Philosophy of Science 55 (1):104-133.
Thomas A. C. Reydon & Paul Hoyningen‐Huene (2010). Discussion: Kuhn's Evolutionary Analogy in the Structure of Scientific Revolutions and “the Road Since Structure”. Philosophy of Science 77 (3):468-476.
Otávio Bueno (2008). Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures. Studia Logica 89 (2):213 - 235.
Darrin W. Belousek (1998). Husserl on Scientific Method and Conceptual Change: A Realist Appraisal. Synthese 115 (1):71-98.
Ingo Brigandt (2006). A Theory of Conceptual Advance: Explaining Conceptual Change in Evolutionary, Molecular, and Evolutionary Developmental Biology. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads43 ( #26,710 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,010 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?