Evolution and continuity in scientific change

Philosophy of Science 56 (3):419-437 (1989)
Abstract
The alleged problem of "incommensurability" is examined, and attempts to explain scientific change in terms of concepts of meaning and reference are analyzed and rejected. A way of understanding scientific change through a properly developed concept of "reasons" is presented, and the issues of reasons, meaning, and reference are placed in the context of this broader interpretation of scientific change
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Ipek Demir (2008). Incommensurabilities in the Work of Thomas Kuhn. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):133-142.
Nader Chokr (1993). Clusters' Last Stand. Social Epistemology 7 (4):329 – 353.
Ruey-lin Chen (2000). Theory Versions Instead of Articulations of a Paradigm. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (3):449-471.
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