Expressibility and the Liar's Revenge

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):297-314 (2011)
There is a standard objection against purported explanations of how a language L can express the notion of being a true sentence of L. According to this objection, such explanations avoid one paradox (the Liar) only to succumb to another of the same kind. Even if L can contain its own truth predicate, we can identify another notion it cannot express, on pain of contradiction via Liar-like reasoning. This paper seeks to undermine such ‘revenge’ by arguing that it presupposes a dubious assumption about the linguistic expression of concepts. Successful revenge would require that there be a notion other than truth that plays the same role with respect to concept-expression that truth is naturally thought to play before we are confronted with the Liar paradox.
Keywords truth  concept-expression  Kripke  Tarski's theorem
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DOI 10.1080/00048401003695156
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.

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Citations of this work BETA
Mark Pinder (2015). A Revenge Problem Without the Concept of Truth. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):151-161.

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