Embodiment, subjectivity, and disembodied existence

Philosophy East and West 61 (1):1-37 (2011)
I think, from the standpoint of present experience, one can fairly start by saying that all experience is lived embodied experience, though it is clear that such a statement, if wholly unqualified, would mean a commitment of extensive implications. 1 Some of these implications I will briefly try to spell out toward the end of this essay. I don’t say our body sets limits to how far our imagination can really go, for clearly, if our imagination were wholly controlled by our body as presented to us, dreams, for example, would not be possible. 2 But dreams are not only possible, they are a matter of everyday experience. Nay, even the limits of imagination do not determine the limits of possibility. ..
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    Michael Tye (1983). On the Possibility of Disembodied Existence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):275-282.
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