David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 109 (2):171-96 (2002)
Theodore Sider distinguishes two notions of global supervenience: strong global supervenience and weak global supervenience. He then discusses some applications to general metaphysical questions. Most interestingly, Sider employs the weak notion in order to undermine a familiar argument against coincident distinct entities. In what follows, I reexamine the two notions and distinguish them from a third, intermediate, notion (intermediate global supervenience). I argue that (a) weak global supervenience is not an adequate notion of dependence; (b) weak global supervenience does not capture certain assumptions about coincidence relations; (c) these assumptions are better accommodated by the stronger notion of intermediate global supervenience; (d) intermediate global supervenience, however, is also not an adequate notion of dependence; and (e) strong global supervenience is an adequate notion of dependence. It also fits in with anti-individualism about the mental. It does not, however, serve to rebut arguments against coincident entities.
|Keywords||Coincidence Entity Global Individualism Metaphysics Supervenience Sider, T|
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Citations of this work BETA
Fabrice Correia (2008). Ontological Dependence. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1013-1032.
L. A. Paul (2006). Coincidence as Overlap. Noûs 40 (4):623–659.
Brian Epstein (2009). Ontological Individualism Reconsidered. Synthese 166 (1):187-213.
Stephen Kearns & Ofra Magidor (2012). Semantic Sovereignty. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):322-350.
Theodore Sider (2008). Yet Another Paper on the Supervenience Argument Against Coincident Entities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):613-624.
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