Global supervenience, coincident entities, and anti-individualism

Philosophical Studies 109 (2):171-96 (2002)
Theodore Sider distinguishes two notions of global supervenience: strong global supervenience and weak global supervenience. He then discusses some applications to general metaphysical questions. Most interestingly, Sider employs the weak notion in order to undermine a familiar argument against coincident distinct entities. In what follows, I reexamine the two notions and distinguish them from a third, intermediate, notion (intermediate global supervenience). I argue that (a) weak global supervenience is not an adequate notion of dependence; (b) weak global supervenience does not capture certain assumptions about coincidence relations; (c) these assumptions are better accommodated by the stronger notion of intermediate global supervenience; (d) intermediate global supervenience, however, is also not an adequate notion of dependence; and (e) strong global supervenience is an adequate notion of dependence. It also fits in with anti-individualism about the mental. It does not, however, serve to rebut arguments against coincident entities.
Keywords Coincidence  Entity  Global  Individualism  Metaphysics  Supervenience  Sider, T
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Fabrice Correia (2008). Ontological Dependence. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1013-1032.
Daniel Z. Korman, Ordinary Objects. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stephen Kearns & Ofra Magidor (2012). Semantic Sovereignty. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):322-350.

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