Hegel’s Criticism of Analogical Procedure and the Search For Final Purpose

The Owl of Minerva 19 (2):169-182 (1988)
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Abstract

In the section called “Observation of Nature” in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel considers and criticizes a particular form of methodology which seeks final purposes by analogy. Through this methodology what is essential for thought is the recognition and demarcation of differentiae, which are imputed to natural objects as qualities by which things maintain their distinct and separate character - what Hegel calls their “being-for-self.” By these differentiae, then, the objects are categorized into types, or “natural kinds,” which, in turn, are interpreted by natural philosophers according to a projected teleological system. Hegel’s critique is not aimed primarily at the categorization of objects, but at the method of interpretation used to characterize these categories as purposeful. In particular, Hegel is not criticizing the use of analogy as discussed in the biological writings of Aristotle, but the use of analogy by the transcendental idealists, especially Kant, who employs this method in the Critique of Judgment.

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Daniel E. Shannon
DePauw University

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