Higher-Order Logic or Set Theory: A False Dilemma

Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3):305-323 (2012)
Abstract
The purpose of this article is show that second-order logic, as understood through standard semantics, is intimately bound up with set theory, or some other general theory of interpretations, structures, or whatever. Contra Quine, this does not disqualify second-order logic from its role in foundational studies. To wax Quinean, why should there be a sharp border separating mathematics from logic, especially the logic of mathematics?
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