David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 75 (5):514-525 (2008)
When conceived as an empirical claim, it is natural to wonder how one might test the hypothesis of multiple realization. I consider general issues of testability, show how they apply specifically to the hypothesis of multiple realization, and propose an auxiliary assumption that, I argue, must be conjoined to the hypothesis of multiple realization to ensure its testability. I argue further that Bechtel and Mundale (1999) go astray because they fail to appreciate the need for this auxiliary assumption. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 5185 Helen C. White Hall, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706; e‐mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Oron Shagrir (1998). Multiple Realization, Computation and the Taxonomy of Psychological States. Synthese 114 (3):445-461.
Robert C. Richardson (2009). Multiple Realization and Methodological Pluralism. Synthese 167 (3):473 - 492.
Mark B. Couch (2004). Discussion: A Defense of Bechtel and Mundale. Philosophy of Science 71 (2):198-204.
Carrie Figdor (2010). Neuroscience and the Multiple Realization of Cognitive Functions. Philosophy of Science 77 (3):419-456.
Sungsu Kim (2011). Multiple Realization and Evidence. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):739 - 749.
Ronald P. Endicott (2010). Realization, Reductios, and Category Inclusion. Journal of Philosophy 107 (4):213-219.
Thomas W. Polger (2008). Two Confusions Concerning Multiple Realization. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):537-547.
Robert C. Richardson (2008). Autonomy and Multiple Realization. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):526-536.
Ken Aizawa (2009). Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale. Synthese 167 (3):493 - 510.
Added to index2009-03-14
Total downloads47 ( #28,815 of 1,011,474 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,700 of 1,011,474 )
How can I increase my downloads?