David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 75 (5):514-525 (2008)
When conceived as an empirical claim, it is natural to wonder how one might test the hypothesis of multiple realization. I consider general issues of testability, show how they apply specifically to the hypothesis of multiple realization, and propose an auxiliary assumption that, I argue, must be conjoined to the hypothesis of multiple realization to ensure its testability. I argue further that Bechtel and Mundale go astray because they fail to appreciate the need for this auxiliary assumption. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 5185 Helen C. White Hall, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706; e‐mail: email@example.com
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Citations of this work BETA
Lawrence A. Shapiro (2012). Mental Manipulations and the Problem of Causal Exclusion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):507 - 524.
Ronald P. Endicott (2011). Flat Versus Dimensioned: The What and the How of Functional Realization. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:191-208.
Thomas W. Polger (2011). Are Sensations Still Brain Processes? Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.
Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (forthcoming). Of Brains and Planets: On a Causal Criterion for Mind-Brain Identities. Synthese:1-13.
Carl Gillett (2010). Moving Beyond the Subset Model of Realization: The Problem of Qualitative Distinctness in the Metaphysics of Science. Synthese 177 (2):165 - 192.
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