Induction and indefinite extensibility: The gödel sentence is true, but did someone change the subject?
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 107 (427):597-624 (1998)
Over the last few decades Michael Dummett developed a rich program for assessing logic and the meaning of the terms of a language. He is also a major exponent of Frege's version of logicism in the philosophy of mathematics. Over the last decade, Neil Tennant developed an extensive version of logicism in Dummettian terms, and Dummett influences other contemporary logicists such as Crispin Wright and Bob Hale. The purpose of this paper is to explore the prospects for Fregean logicism within a broadly Dummettian framework. The conclusions are mostly negative: Dummett's views on analyticity and the logical/non-logical boundary leave little room for logicism. Dummett's considerations concerning manifestation and separability lead to a conservative extension requirement: if a sentence S is logically true, then there is a proof of S which uses only the introduction and elimination rules of the logical terms that occur in S. If basic arithmetic propositions are logically true - as the logicist contends - then there is tension between this conservation requirement and the ontological commitments of arithmetic. It follows from Dummett's manifestation requirements that if a sentence S is composed entirely of logical terminology, then there is a formal deductive system D such that S is analytic, or logically true, if and only if S is a theorem of D. There is a deep conflict between this result and the essential incompleteness, or as Dummett puts it, the indefinite extensibility, of arithmetic truth.
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