Inquiry 26 (1):125 – 131 (1983)
|Abstract||John R. Searle has recently observed that something might instantiate a Chinese??understanding? computer program without having any understanding of Chinese. He thinks that this implies that instantiating such a program is ?never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality?. I show that this phrase is incoherent, and that all that follows is that instantiating such a program is not in every case a sufficient condition for the given intentionality. But the conclusion to Searle's argument, thus revised, is neither new nor significant; Searle's arguments merely raise old issues in new clothing|
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