I. it ain't the meat, it's the motion

Inquiry 26 (1):125 – 131 (1983)
John R. Searle has recently observed that something might instantiate a Chinese??understanding? computer program without having any understanding of Chinese. He thinks that this implies that instantiating such a program is ?never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality?. I show that this phrase is incoherent, and that all that follows is that instantiating such a program is not in every case a sufficient condition for the given intentionality. But the conclusion to Searle's argument, thus revised, is neither new nor significant; Searle's arguments merely raise old issues in new clothing
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201748308601987
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,201
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
David Hume (2007). Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophical Review. Blackwell Pub. Ltd. 338-339.
Benjamin Boretz & Edward T. Cone (1979). Perspectives on Contemporary Music Theory. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 37 (3):380-381.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Richard Sharvy (1985). Searle on Programs and Intentionality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:39-54.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

40 ( #118,461 of 1,940,952 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #333,818 of 1,940,952 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.