I. it ain't the meat, it's the motion

Inquiry 26 (1):125 – 131 (1983)
John R. Searle has recently observed that something might instantiate a Chinese??understanding? computer program without having any understanding of Chinese. He thinks that this implies that instantiating such a program is ?never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality?. I show that this phrase is incoherent, and that all that follows is that instantiating such a program is not in every case a sufficient condition for the given intentionality. But the conclusion to Searle's argument, thus revised, is neither new nor significant; Searle's arguments merely raise old issues in new clothing
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    References found in this work BETA
    David Hume (2007/2006). Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell Pub. Ltd..
    John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
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