Korsgaard on hypothetical imperatives

Philosophical Studies 129 (2):335 - 347 (2006)
Abstract
I argue that rationalists need not adopt Kant’s method for determining what one has reason to do, where by “Kant’s method” I mean the view that normative guidance comes only from directives imposed on the agent by the agent’s own will. I focus on Kant’s argument for “imperatives of skill,” one sort of hypothetical imperative. I argue, against Korsgaard, that Kant’s argument is neither better nor significantly different than the sort of argument non-Kantian rationalists offer. I close by arguing that Korsgaard is wrong to think that her question “why should I care about performing the means to my ends?” is a serious worry.
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References found in this work BETA
Rachel Cohon (2000). The Roots of Reasons. Philosophical Review 109 (1):63-85.
Thomas E. Hill Jr (1973). The Hypothetical Imperative. Philosophical Review 82 (4):429-450.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1997). The Normativity of Instrumental Reason. In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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