David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):311-329 (2007)
There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the potential vulnerabilities of moral realism on this front are quite different from those of the theist. Key Words: causal power explanatory power Gilbert Harman moral facts moral realism theism.
|Keywords||Gilbert Harman Moral Causal Power Explanatory Power Theism Realism Moral Facts|
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Elliott Sober (2015). Two Cornell Realisms: Moral and Scientific. Philosophical Studies 172 (4):905-924.
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