Philosophical Studies 139 (2):289 - 306 (2008)
|Abstract||Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (roughly, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (forthcoming). Epistemic Closure Under Deductive Inference: What is It and Can We Afford It? Synthese.
Jérôme Dokic & Paul Égré (2009). Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge. Synthese 166 (1):1 - 20.
Neil Tennant (2001). Is Every Truth Knowable? Reply to Williamson. Ratio 14 (3):263–280.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2005). Williamson on Knowledge, Action, and Causation. Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy 6:15-28.
Simon Dierig (2010). The Discrimination Argument Revisited. Erkenntnis 72 (1):73 - 92.
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2008). Single Premise Deduction and Risk. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173.
Wai-hung Wong (2008). What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):536-543.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads55 ( #21,932 of 722,863 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #14,866 of 722,863 )
How can I increase my downloads?